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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
Defendant Halcόn Energy Properties, Inc. (“Halcόn”) 
appeals the District Court’s Order remanding this case to state 
court based on the “home state” exception to subject matter 
jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”).  
For the reasons stated below, we will affirm the District 
Court’s remand order, but do so instead based on CAFA’s 
“local controversy” exception. 
I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 Plaintiffs Jeffry S. Vodenichar, David M. King, Jr., 
Leigh V. King, Joseph B. Davis, Lauren E. Davis, Grove City 
Country Club, and Richard Broadhead filed suit on behalf of 
themselves and other similarly situated landowners who 
sought to lease the oil and gas rights in their land in Mercer 
County, Pennsylvania.  Defendants Morascyzk & Polochak 
(“M&P”) and Co-eXprise, d/b/a “CX-Energy,” (“CX-
Energy”) agreed to act as Plaintiffs’ agents to negotiate leases 
of their oil and gas interests to energy companies under the 
terms of Landowner MarketPlace Agreements (“LMAs”).  In 
exchange for their successful marketing efforts, M&P and 
CX-Energy were to be paid a “transaction fee.”   
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 M&P and CX-Energy entered into a Letter of Intent 
with Halcόn (“Halcόn Agreement”), an oil and gas company, 
pursuant to which Halcόn would lease up to 60,000 acres of 
oil and gas rights from landowners who entered into LMAs 
and who had submitted lease documents to Halcόn.  Under 
the Halcόn Agreement, each landowner who executed an 
LMA was guaranteed a $3,850 per acre payment plus an 
18.5% royalty on the net amount Halcόn realized from the oil 
and gas recovered from the property.  
  According to Plaintiffs, Halcόn agreed to accept the 
leases absent a title defect, an adverse environmental claim, 
or restrictions on the ability to explore, drill for, or produce 
oil, gas, or hydrocarbons.  Plaintiffs assert that Halcόn 
rejected many of the leases for reasons other than those 
permitted under the Halcόn Agreement.  Halcόn counters that 
the word “geology” was fraudulently omitted from the list of 
grounds upon which it could decline to lease the property, and 
that Halcόn was within its bargained-for rights to reject the 
leases.  Plaintiffs claim that this explanation was pretextual, 
as Halcόn sought to extricate itself from the lease 
arrangement because it lost a bid to secure oil and gas rights 
in other nearby properties, which made the leases of 
Plaintiffs’ land less attractive.  Plaintiffs further claim that 
they did not know that any words were omitted from the 
agreements and if a change had been made, it was the fault of 
M&P and CX-Energy.     
 As a result of these events, Plaintiffs filed a putative 
class action against Halcόn based upon diversity jurisdiction, 
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), in the United States District Court for 
the Western District of Pennsylvania (“first filed action”).  In 
their complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that Halcόn breached their 
agreement and the duty of fair dealing.  Halcόn filed an 
answer and the District Court convened a case management 
conference.  During the conference, Halcόn informed the 
District Court that it anticipated joining M&P and CX-
Energy, claiming that they were “necessary parties.”  Case 
Mgmt. Conf. Tr. 13-14, No. 12-1624 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 
2013), ECF No. 31. 
  Plaintiffs decided to file direct claims against M&P 
and CX-Energy.  Knowing that adding these parties to the 
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complaint would destroy diversity jurisdiction, Plaintiffs filed 
a motion to dismiss the first filed action without prejudice and 
with the intent of pursuing their claims against all defendants 
in state court.  In response to the motion, Halcόn stated that it 
did not oppose joining M&P and CX-Energy, agreed that the 
claims against all three defendants would benefit from being 
heard in a single proceeding, but asserted that the case should 
proceed in the District Court under CAFA, particularly given 
the discovery already produced and the ongoing alternative 
dispute resolution (“ADR”) activities.  
 The District Court granted the motion to voluntarily 
dismiss the first filed action without prejudice, reasoning that 
the parties agreed that the claims should proceed in one 
forum, federal diversity would be destroyed by the addition of 
M&P and CX-Energy, and CAFA had not been pled as a 
basis for jurisdiction.  The District Court also ordered the 
parties to complete the ADR process and directed the parties 
to retain the discovery produced to both facilitate the ADR 
process and assist in the state court case.   
 On the day Plaintiffs filed their motion to dismiss the 
first filed action, they, through their same counsel, filed a 
state court class action complaint in the Court of Common 
Pleas of Mercer County, Pennsylvania, alleging that Halcόn, 
M&P, and CX-Energy breached their agreements with, and 
duties to, the putative class (“second filed action”).  The 
second filed complaint is identical to the first filed complaint, 
except with respect to the addition of two named plaintiffs, 
two defendants, the causes of action against the additional 
defendants, seven paragraphs setting forth the facts 
supporting those additional claims, and several exhibits 
relating thereto.   
 Halcόn then removed the second filed action to the 
District Court, which was assigned to the same District Judge 
as the first filed action. On the cover sheet that accompanied 
the removal petition, Halcόn indicated that the second filed 
action was related to the first filed action.  In a text-entry 
order filed in the second filed action shortly after removal, the 
District Court made specific reference to the first filed action, 
including a directive that the parties inform the District Court 
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of the status of the ADR process that the Court had ordered in 
the first filed action. 
 Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand the second filed 
action based upon CAFA’s local controversy exception to 
federal subject matter jurisdiction.  The District Court found 
that the local controversy exception did not apply, but held 
that CAFA’s home state exception required remanding the 
case to the Court of Common Pleas.  Halcόn petitioned for 
review of the remand order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1453(c)(1), which we granted.   
II. JURISDICTION & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1453(c) and review issues of subject matter 
jurisdiction and statutory interpretation de novo.  Kaufman v. 
Allstate New Jersey Insurance Co., 561 F.3d 144, 151 (3d 
Cir. 2009). 
III. DISCUSSION 
 CAFA provides federal courts with jurisdiction over 
civil class actions if the “matter in controversy exceeds the 
sum or value of $5,000,000,” the aggregate number of 
proposed class members is 100 or more, and any class 
member is a citizen of a state different from any defendant.  
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (d)(2)(A), (d)(5)(B).  Thus, the 
statute authorizes federal jurisdiction over class actions even 
in the absence of complete diversity between the parties, 
except where the “controversy is uniquely” connected to the 
state in which the action was originally filed.  Kaufman, 561 
F.3d at 149 & n.4.  To this end, the statute includes two 
mandatory exceptions to federal subject matter jurisdiction, 
known as the “local controversy” and  “home state” 
exceptions.  28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)-(B).  The party 
seeking to invoke an exception bears the burden of proving 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the exception 
applies.
1
  Kaufman, 561 F.3d at 153-54. 
                                              
1
 Because these exceptions are examined to determine 
whether a federal court has subject matter jurisdiction, “our 
inquiry is limited to examining the case ‘as of the time it was 
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 Upon determining that the local controversy exception 
was inapplicable, the District Court concluded that the home 
state exception applied to this case.  For the reasons explained 
herein, we part company with the District Court and conclude 
that CAFA’s home state exception is inapplicable to this case, 
but that remand is warranted under the local controversy 
exception. 
A. Home State Exception 
 The home state exception requires a federal court to 
decline to exercise subject matter jurisdiction in CAFA class 
actions where “two-thirds or more of the members of all 
                                                                                                     
filed in state court[.]’”  Std. Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. 
Ct. 1345, 1349 (2013) (quoting Wisc. Dep’t of Corrs. v. 
Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 390 (1998)) (concluding that, 
although District Court appropriately considered stipulation 
in the complaint by the class action plaintiff to an amount in 
controversy below CAFA’s jurisdictional threshold, the 
District Court wrongly concluded that the precertification 
stipulation was binding on the absent class members).  As we 
noted in Erie Ins. Exch. v. Erie Indem. Co., No. 13-1415, __ 
F.3d __, 2013 WL 3481493, at *3 (3d Cir. June 28, 2013), in 
evaluating whether removal was proper, “we generally focus 
on the allegations in the Complaint and the notice of 
removal.” Id.  (emphasis added).  Courts may consider 
pleadings as well as  evidence that the parties submit to 
determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists or an 
exception thereto applies.  See Coleman v. Estes Express 
Lines, Inc., 631 F.3d 1010, 1015-17 (9th Cir. 2011) (relying 
solely on the pleadings to evaluate the “significant relief” and 
“significant basis of the claims” factors under the local 
controversy exception, but considering external evidence to 
determine the “citizenship” factor); Coffey v. Freeport 
McMoran Copper & Gold, 581 F.3d 1240, 1246 (10th Cir. 
2009) (looking to the total activity of a company to determine 
the “citizenship” factor ); Moua v. Jani-King of Minn., Inc., 
613 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1108-09 (D. Minn. 2009) (considering 
the allegations and plaintiff’s arguments in other 
submissions); Anthony v. Small Tube Mfg. Corp., 535 F. 
Supp. 2d 506, 517 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (considering defendant’s 
answer and averments). 
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proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate, and the primary 
defendants, are citizens of the State in which the action was 
originally filed.”  28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B).  A party seeking 
to invoke this exception must therefore: (1) establish that the 
citizenship of the members of two-thirds or more of the 
putative class is the state in which the action was originally 
filed; (2) establish the citizenship of the defendants; (3) 
identify the primary defendants; and (4) demonstrate that 
two-thirds or more of the members of the putative class are 
citizens of the same state as the primary defendants.  See 
Anthony, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 514-15.   
 There is no dispute that the named plaintiffs, more 
than two-thirds of the class members,
2
 CX-Energy, and M&P 
are all citizens of Pennsylvania, the state where the action was 
originally filed.
3
  Halcόn is a Delaware Corporation with its 
principal place of business and headquarters in Texas, and 
thus it is not a citizen of Pennsylvania.   
 Having established the citizenships of the parties and 
two-thirds or more of the putative class, the Court must next 
identify the “primary defendants” under Section 
                                              
2
 Members of the putative class who are natural 
persons are deemed citizens of the state in which they are 
domiciled, which is typically the state where the person lives.  
See Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 
828 (1989); District of Columbia v. Murphy, 314 U.S. 441, 
455 (1941).  Under CAFA, suits brought “by unincorporated 
associations [are] treated like suits by corporations in that the 
citizenship of the association for diversity purposes is 
determined by the entities’ principal place of business and not 
by the citizenship of its members.”  Erie Ins., 2013 WL 
3481493, at *6 n.7; 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(10).   
3
 CX-Energy is deemed a citizen of Pennsylvania, 
which is both its state of incorporation, 28 U.S.C. § 
1332(c)(1), and the place “where the corporation’s high level 
officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s 
activities.”  Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 80 (2010).  
As an unincorporated association, CAFA deems M&P “to be 
a citizen of the State where it has its principal place of 
business and the State under whose laws it is organized,” 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(d)(10), which in this case is Pennsylvania.   
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1332(d)(4)(B).  Here, the District Court concluded that the 
home state exception applied based upon its determination 
that M&P and CX-Energy were the only primary defendants 
and both were citizens of Pennsylvania, where the second 
filed action was originally filed.  Because Halcόn had denied 
liability in its answer, the District Court reasoned that Halcόn 
was not a primary defendant.  We conclude, however, that 
Halcόn—which is not a citizen of Pennsylvania—is a primary 
defendant, thereby rendering CAFA’s home state exception 
inapplicable to this case. 
CAFA itself does not define the phrase “primary 
defendants.”  The word “primary” has several meanings, 
including: “first in order of time or development,” 
“primitive,” “of first rank, importance, or value,” “principal,” 
“basic,” “fundamental,” “direct,” “firsthand,” and “belonging 
to the first group or order in successive divisions, 
combinations or ramifications.”  Merriam-Webster’s 
Collegiate Dictionary 923 (10th ed. 2002).  Looking at the 
surrounding statutory language, we can rule out certain of 
these definitions (such as those that focus on sequence), and 
construe the word primary to mean “principal,” 
“fundamental,” or “direct.”  
 Some courts have embraced the definition of primary 
to mean direct and construed the words “primary defendants” 
to capture those defendants who are directly liable to the 
proposed class, as opposed to being vicariously or secondarily 
liable based upon theories of contribution or indemnification.  
See, e.g., Copper Sands Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Copper 
Sands Realty, LLC, No. 2:10-cv-00510, 2011 WL 941079, at 
*6 (D. Nev. Mar. 16, 2011); Anthony, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 517;  
Kitson v. Bank of Edwardsville, No. 06-528, 2006 WL 
3392752, at *13-17 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 22, 2006).  This 
construction finds support in the statements of CAFA’s 
Sponsors, which describe the primary defendants as those 
who are the “real targets” of the lawsuit.  151 Cong. Rec. 
H723-01, 2005 WL 387992 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) 
(statement of Rep. Goodlatte); see also H.R. Rep. No. 108-
144, 2003 WL 21321526, at 38 (2003) (stating that “[t]he 
sponsors intend that primary defendants be intended to reach 
those defendants who are the real targets of the lawsuit, i.e., 
the defendants who would be expected to incur most of the 
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loss if liability is found.”)  This language shows that the 
Sponsors were focused on the defendants who plaintiffs 
alleged are the real wrongdoers as opposed to those 
defendants who may have to pay because of the actions of 
others.
4
  Therefore, the direct versus secondary liability 
distinction some courts use is consistent with the legislative 
intent.   
 Courts also look at the allegations to identify the 
defendants expected to sustain the greatest loss if liability 
were found, Bennett v. Bd. of Comm’rs for East Jefferson 
Levee Dist., Nos. 07-3130, 07-3131, 2007 WL 2571942, at *6 
(E.D. La. Aug. 31, 2007) (comparing the maximum exposure 
of liability for each defendant to determine primacy), and 
whether such defendants have “substantial exposure to 
significant portions of the proposed class.”5  Robinson v. 
Cheetah Transp., No. 06-0005, 2006 WL 468820, at *2 n.7 
(W.D. La. Nov. 14, 2006).
6
  These considerations, therefore, 
                                              
4
 For this reason, courts examining whether a 
defendant is a “primary defendant” should not consider 
whether the defendant may be able to recover from others or 
whether it is able to satisfy the judgment.   
5
 This is also consistent with the legislative history.  
The Sponsors explicitly stated that “[t]he term “primary 
defendant” should include any person who has substantial 
exposure to significant portions of the proposed class in the 
action, particularly any defendant that is allegedly liable to 
the vast majority of the members of the proposed classes, as 
opposed to simply a few individual class members.”  151 
Cong. Rec. H723-01, 2005 WL 387992 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 
2005) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte); see also H.R. Rep. No. 
108-144, 2003 WL 21321526, at 38 (2003).  Thus, the 
Sponsors intended the identity of the “primary defendants” to 
be determined based upon the allegations concerning the 
defendants expected to be liable to the greatest number of 
class members and to suffer the greatest loss if liability is 
found. 
6
 See also Hollinger v. Home State Mut. Ins. Co., 654 
F.3d 564, 572 (5th Cir. 2011) (finding that defendants were 
primary defendants after considering the fact that all punitive 
class members had claims against them and that they had 
issued the insurance policies at the center of the dispute).   
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focus on the number of class members purportedly impacted 
by the defendant’s alleged actions and the amount the 
defendant may lose if found liable.  To determine the number 
of class members to whom a defendant may be liable and to 
identify the defendants who would sustain the greatest loss if 
found liable, courts must assume liability will be established.
7
  
As a result, courts should not consider whether a defendant 
has denied liability, and the District Court’s reliance on 
Halcόn’s denial of liability was misplaced.    
 In short, courts tasked with determining whether a 
defendant is a “primary defendant” under CAFA should 
assume liability will be found and determine whether the 
defendant is the “real target” of the plaintiffs’ accusations.  In 
doing so, they should also determine if the plaintiffs seek to 
hold the defendant responsible for its own actions, as opposed 
to seeking to have it pay for the actions of others.  Also, 
courts should ask whether, given the claims asserted against 
the defendant, it has potential exposure to a significant 
portion of the class and would sustain a substantial loss as 
compared to other defendants if found liable.  
 Applying these principles, we conclude that Plaintiffs 
allege that each defendant is directly liable, appear to 
apportion liability equally among the defendants, and seek 
similar relief from all defendants.  While more claims are 
asserted against M&P and CX-Energy than against Halcόn, 
the claims against Halcόn are as, if not more, significant in 
that Plaintiffs allege Halcόn breached its lease agreement 
with more than 1,000 landowners and owes damages 
exceeding $50,000 to each class member.  Thus, Halcόn is a 
“primary defendant.”    
 Finally, by using the word “the” before the words 
“primary defendants” rather than the word “a,” the statute 
requires remand under the home state exception only if all 
primary defendants are citizens of Pennsylvania.  Anthony, 
535 F. Supp. 2d at 515.  Because Halcόn is a primary 
defendant and is not from the same state as the Pennsylvania 
                                              
7
 This is in keeping with the contingent nature of the 
Sponsors’ language (i.e., “if liability is found”).  H.R. Rep. 
No. 108-144, 2003 WL 21321526, at 38 (2003). 
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class members, remand based upon this exception is not 
warranted.   
 For these reasons, we conclude that the home state 
exception does not apply and remand should not have been 
ordered on this basis.   
B.   Local Controversy Exception 
 Finding the District Court’s rationale for remand 
lacking, we turn to the other exception to CAFA’s subject 
matter jurisdiction: the local controversy exception.  The 
District Court ruled that the local controversy exception did 
not apply to this case because another class action had been 
filed arising from the same facts and asserting similar claims.  
For the reasons set forth herein, we conclude that “no other 
class action” had been filed as contemplated under CAFA, 
and therefore remand of this case pursuant to the local 
controversy exception is appropriate. 
Under the local controversy exception: 
A district court shall decline to exercise 
jurisdiction under paragraph (2)— 
(A)(i) over a class action in which— 
(I) greater than two-thirds of the members of 
all proposed plaintiff classes in the 
aggregate are citizens of the State in which 
the action was originally filed; 
(II) at least 1 defendant is a defendant— 
(aa) from whom significant relief is 
sought by members of the plaintiff class; 
(bb) whose alleged conduct forms a 
significant basis for the claims asserted 
by the proposed plaintiff class; and 
(cc) who is a citizen of the State in which 
the action was originally filed; and 
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(III) principal injuries resulting from the 
alleged conduct or any related conduct of 
each defendant were incurred in the State in 
which the action was originally filed; and 
(ii) during the 3–year period preceding the 
filing of that class action, no other class action 
has been filed asserting the same or similar 
factual allegations against any of the defendants 
on behalf of the same or other persons[.] 
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A).  A party seeking to invoke this 
exception must therefore show that: (1) greater than two-
thirds of the putative class are citizens of the state in which 
the action was originally filed; (2) at least one defendant is a 
citizen of the state in which the action was originally filed 
(the “local defendant”); (3) the local defendant’s conduct 
forms a significant basis for the claims asserted; (4) plaintiffs 
are seeking significant relief from the local defendant; (5) the 
principal injuries occurred in the state in which the action was 
originally filed; and (6) no other class action asserting the 
same or similar allegations against any of the defendants had 
been filed in the preceding three years.  These elements 
ensure that the exception is invoked when the class is 
primarily local, the lawsuit is against “at least one real in-state 
defendant whose alleged conduct is central to the class claims 
and from whom the class seeks significant relief,” the injuries 
the defendant allegedly caused occurred within the forum, 
and no other similar class actions have been filed against any 
of the defendants.  151 Cong. Rec. S999-02, 2005 WL 
283380 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2005) (statement of Sen. Specter).  
Each element of the local controversy exception is met 
and remand pursuant to this exception is warranted.    
First, as stated previously, there is no dispute that more 
than two-thirds of the class members are citizens of 
Pennsylvania. 
Second, there is no dispute that at least one defendant 
named in the case is local—that is, from the state in which the 
case was originally filed.  As discussed above, both M&P and 
CX-Energy are citizens of Pennsylvania, the state in which 
13 
 
the case was originally filed, and hence are local defendants 
under CAFA. 
Third, each local defendant’s “alleged conduct forms a 
significant basis for the claims asserted by the proposed 
plaintiff class.”  28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(II)(bb).8  As 
agents for the putative class members, the local defendants 
entered an agreement with Halcόn pursuant to which Halcόn 
would lease up to 60,000 acres of Plaintiffs’ oil and gas 
rights.  Plaintiffs allege that the local defendants breached 
their contractual and fiduciary obligations to the class by 
failing to ensure that the lease agreements conformed to 
Halcόn’s requirements and made negligent misrepresentations 
to the class concerning the basis upon which Halcόn could 
refuse to enter the leases.
9
  Put differently, Plaintiffs 
essentially assert that M&P and CX-Energy made 
misrepresentations to induce them to relinquish their oil and 
gas rights and caused Halcόn to decline to enter the lease 
agreement by changing the terms of the agreement and that 
these actions damaged Plaintiffs.  Because Plaintiffs’ claims 
are based upon Halcόn’s rejection of the leases and because 
Halcόn allegedly rejected the leases based on language that 
the local defendants purportedly omitted, the local 
defendants’ conduct forms a “significant basis” of Plaintiffs’ 
claims.   
Fourth, Plaintiffs are seeking “significant relief” from 
both local defendants.  Plaintiffs seek from the local 
defendants damages totaling more than $50,000 for each of 
                                              
8
 This factor does not require that each class member 
assert a claim against that local defendant nor must the local 
defendant’s alleged conduct form the basis of every claim 
asserted.  Kaufman, 561 F.3d at 155.  The focus is on the 
conduct in which the local defendant allegedly engaged and 
the alleged number of people impacted by it. 
9
 Halcόn’s cross-claim also alleges that the local 
defendants agreed to include language in certain lease 
documents that did not appear in the documents that plaintiffs 
signed.  Halcόn claims that the local defendants made 
statements concerning the basis upon which Halcόn could 
reject the lease, which Halcόn alleges contradicts the written 
agreement.   
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the 1,362 class members and a declaration that the local 
defendants were not entitled to receive fees from Plaintiffs for 
the lease transactions.  While monetary and declaratory relief 
is also sought from Halcόn, this does not change the fact that 
significant relief is being sought from the local defendants. 
Fifth, there is no dispute that the “principal injuries” 
resulting from the alleged conduct or related conduct of each 
defendant were “incurred in the state in which the case was 
originally filed.”  28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(III).10  Here, 
most class members who sought to lease their oil and gas 
rights allegedly reside in, and all of the land is located in, 
Mercer County, Pennsylvania.  Thus, Pennsylvania citizens 
own the land that is at the heart of this dispute, and they were 
allegedly financially injured by the defendants’ alleged 
breach of the agreements to lease the oil and gas rights to 
their Pennsylvania property.   
Finally, contrary to the District Court, we determine 
that no other class action, as contemplated by CAFA, 
asserting the same or similar allegations against any of the 
defendants had been filed in the preceding three years.  While 
we recognize that Plaintiffs filed two separate putative class 
action complaints against Halcόn, the act of filing a 
subsequent complaint does not necessarily mean that the 
earlier filed action bars invocation of the exception.  Indeed, 
close scrutiny of the two cases shows that the first filed action 
does not constitute an “other class action” as contemplated by 
CAFA.   
CAFA does not define what constitutes an “other class 
action” other than to limit it to filed cases asserting similar 
factual allegations against a defendant.  The goals of the 
statute, however, provide guidance.  In enacting CAFA, 
Congress recognized the benefits of having one federal forum 
                                              
10
 This provision is written in the disjunctive and 
hence, the provision is “satisfied either 1) when principal 
injuries resulting from the alleged conduct of each defendant 
were incurred in the state in which the action was originally 
filed ‘or’ 2) when principal injuries resulting from any related 
conduct of each defendant were incurred in the state.”  
Kaufman, 561 F.3d at 158.   
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to adjudicate multiple cases filed in various courts against a 
defendant.  See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. 
No. 109-2, § 2(a)(1), 119 Stat. 4.  To this end, the statute 
seeks to control the impact of multiple class actions filed by 
different members of the same class against a defendant by 
providing a single forum to resolve similar claims.  See S. 
Rep. No. 109-14, at 4-5 (2005), reprinted in 2005 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 5-6; DeHart v. BP America, Inc., No. 09-
626, 2010 WL 231744, at *12 (W.D. La. Jan. 14, 2010).  
Moreover, Congress sought to have all but truly local 
controversies
11
 proceed in federal court and found that when a 
“controversy results in the filing of multiple class actions, it is 
a strong signal that those cases may not be of the variety that 
[the local controversy] exception is intended to address.”  S. 
Rep. No. 109-14, at 40-41, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 39; see also 
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 
2(b)(2), 119 Stat. 4.    
 In short, Congress wanted to ensure that defendants 
did not face copycat, or near copycat, suits in multiple forums 
and hence excluded from the local controversy exception 
cases where a defendant was named in multiple similar cases.  
It follows that the “no other class action” factor must not be 
read too narrowly.  The “inquiry is whether similar factual 
allegations have been made against the defendant in multiple 
class actions”—and hence they are facing separate, distinct 
lawsuits—without regard to the procedural posture of the 
earlier filed cases or whether the putative classes in the cases 
overlap, their claims arise from an identical event, or involve 
the same causes of action or legal theories.
12
  S. Rep. No. 
                                              
11
 The local controversy exception seeks to “identify a 
truly local controversy—a controversy that uniquely affects a 
particular locality to the exclusion of all others”  151 Cong. 
Rec. H723-01, 2005 WL 387992 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) 
(statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner), and “enables State courts 
to adjudicate truly local disputes involving principal injuries 
concentrated within the forum State.”  151 Cong. Rec. S999-
02, 2005 WL 283380 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2005) (statement of 
Sen. Specter). 
12
 Also, if two class actions arise out of the same facts, 
but are factually and analytically different, such that the proof 
necessary for one class to prevail differs from the proof 
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109-14, at 41, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 39; see also Giannini v. 
Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. 12-77, 2012 WL 1535196, at *5 
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2012); Rasberry, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 605. 
 The question here is whether the first and second filed 
actions are the same case or if the first filed action is an 
“other class action,” as contemplated under the local 
controversy exception.  The same representative plaintiffs 
filed two complaints on behalf of an identically-defined 
putative class arising from the same factual allegations.  
While the first filed action was pending in federal court, the 
parties proceeded with discovery and Halcόn disclosed its 
intention to join the local defendants based on their role in the 
transaction that gave rise to the dispute.  Plaintiffs then 
expressed a desire to add them as direct defendants.  Instead 
of amending the first filed complaint in a way that would 
destroy complete diversity, Plaintiffs sought to voluntarily 
dismiss the first filed action so that Plaintiffs and Halcόn 
could assert claims against the local defendants in a single 
forum in which subject matter jurisdiction undisputedly 
existed.  Apparently recognizing the possibility that, absent a 
settlement, the dispute between the sides would continue, the 
District Court granted the motion to dismiss the first filed 
action without prejudice but ordered the parties to participate 
in ADR and to retain the discovery that they had exchanged 
for use in both the ADR and the case that joined the two local 
defendants.  Thus, the District Court’s actions showed that it 
considered the second filed action a continuation of the first 
filed action and took practical steps to ensure that the act of 
filing the second complaint did not delay the parties’ ability 
to proceed.  Treating the second filed action in this way is 
consistent with the goal of the local controversy exception of 
ensuring that the defendants are not subject to similar claims 
in different forums and allowing all claims against them to 
proceed in a coordinated fashion.  
   Furthermore, this is not a copycat situation where the 
defendants face similar class claims brought by different 
                                                                                                     
another class would need to present, the first filed class action 
would not constitute an “other” class action as defined in 
CAFA.  Rasberry v. Capitol Cnty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 609 F. 
Supp. 2d 594, 605 (E.D. Tex. 2009). 
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named plaintiffs and different counsel in different forums.  
Rather, the named Plaintiffs and their counsel brought class 
claims in November 2012 and, based on Halcόn’s disclosure, 
Plaintiffs decided to enlarge the case to add the two local 
defendants together with claims unique to those parties that 
arose from the same transactions.  In practical terms, 
Plaintiffs’ actions were no different from a situation where a 
party amends a pleading to join parties to an existing case, 
which is indeed what Halcόn itself stated it intended to do 
during the original district court proceeding.  Indeed, there is 
nothing in the record that would suggest otherwise. 
In short, Halcόn is defending the same case that it had 
been defending since November 2012 with the exception of 
the addition of the other parties Halcόn intended to join.  The 
first filed action therefore is not an “other class action” as 
contemplated under CAFA, but rather is the same case, albeit 
enlarged, and thus, the “no other class action” prong of the 
local controversy exception is satisfied. 
 For these reasons, the local controversy exception to 
CAFA jurisdiction mandates remand of this truly local case 
involving Pennsylvania landowners and their land.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of 
the District Court granting the motion to remand. 
